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REGULATORY COOPERATION,
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, AND
WORLD TRADE LAW: CONFLICT OR
COMPLEMENTARITY?
ROBERT HOWSE*
I
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, a major function of the free trade agreements, whether
bilateral or regional, has been the reduction to zero of tariffs among the parties.
These agreements lead to greater liberalization than that available through the
1
World Trade Organization (WTO) multilateral system. Critics of such deals
have worried that the result will be so-called “trade diversion,” in which goods
are sourced from within the free trade area in question, even if the lowest2
cost—that is, the most efficient producer—is elsewhere. But the WTO system
has traditionally been permissive of arrangements that provide more
advantageous market access in the form of lower tariffs or related border
measures to parties in a free trade area (like the North American Free Trade
Agreement) or customs union (like the European Union). Specifically, Article
XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provides an
exception to the Most Favored Nation (MFN) obligation with respect to border
measures when it is necessary to create and maintain such preferential
3
arrangements. As applied rates of tariff on all but the most sensitive (in a
political economy sense) products have been significantly reduced among most
major trading states, however, the rationale for regional agreements has shifted
to nontariff, nonborder measures, whether through intellectual property rules
4
or through domestic regulations and standards. The extent to which a WTOCopyright © 2015 by Robert Howse.
This article is also available at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/.
* Lloyd C. Nelson Professor of International Law, New York University School of Law. I am
grateful to Radha Raghavan for excellent research assistance, and to Petros Mavroidis, Gabrielle
Marceau, and Lorand Bartels for useful discussion and e-mail exchanges on some of the issues
discussed in this article.
1. See generally Shujiro Urata, Globalization and the Growth in Free Trade Agreements, 9 ASIAPAC. REV. no. 1, 2002, at 20 (exploring regional integration and trade through the lens of free-trade
agreement and regional-trade agreement growth in Japan).
2. See, e.g., JAGDISH BHAGWATI, TERMITES IN THE TRADING SYSTEM: HOW PREFERENTIAL
AGREEMENTS UNDERMINE FREE TRADE xii, 17 (2008) (describing the surge of preferential trade
agreements as “a trade wreck”).
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXIV, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GATT].
4. Michael Trebilcock, Robert Howse & Antonia Eliason, The Regulation of International Trade,
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plus approach as contemplated in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP), for example, is consistent with the WTO approach based
on nondiscrimination among all members of the WTO is much less clear from
the law and jurisprudence than it is for preferential tariffs or elimination of
tariffs on a bilateral or regional basis, protected, as mentioned by GATT
Article XXIV.
This article addresses several issues. First, does the exception in Article
XXIV of GATT apply at all to GATT disciplines that require
nondiscrimination in regulatory measures between WTO members when the
same conditions prevail? Second, the WTO’s Agreement on Technical Barriers
to Trade (TBT) is a specialized agreement that focuses on product standards
5
and regulations. Likewise, the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) focuses on such standards in the food and
6
agriculture sectors. Neither of these agreements contains any equivalent of the
GATT Article XXIV provisions that would exempt regulatory cooperation in
the context of a free trade agreement from the relevant WTO disciplines. Yet
7
both agreements contain obligations to use international standards. The
question is how these obligations might limit the use of specific standards as a
basis for free trade in goods among parties to free trade agreements. Whereas
mutual recognition is encouraged by both agreements—and the TBT
specifically addresses regional standardization—the MFN provision is
8
nonetheless affirmed. This raises the issue of the extent to which such
standards can exclude or impose greater barriers to products from WTO
members not parties to that free trade area. Third, the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS) does contain a provision analogous to Article XXIV
9
of the GATT. It has not been tested in any dispute before any of the WTO
Dispute Settlement Organs—that is, the Dispute Settlement Body, the panels
constituted by the Dispute Settlement Body, or the WTO Appellate Body—and
the GATS contains its own code-of-conduct approach for addressing regulatory
differences on a sector-by-sector basis. So far, a completed agreement has only
10
been achieved in the area of accounting standards.
II
TRADE IN GOODS: THE GATT
The MFN provision, found in Article I of GATT, applies on its face not only
to tariff concessions, but also to regulatory measures adopted by the WTO

§ 258 (4th ed. 2013).
5. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Jan. 1, 1995, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter TBT].
6. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Jan. 1, 1995, 1867
U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS].
7. See TBT , supra note 5, pmbl.; SPS supra note 6, pmbl.
8. See TBT supra note 5, art. 4.1.
9. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Jan. 1 1995, 169 U.N.T.S. 183 [hereinafter GATS].
10. See International Accounting Standards, DELOITTE, http://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/ias.
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members, whether unilaterally or through bilateral or regional regulatory
11
cooperation. Therefore, when cooperation under a bilateral or regional trade
agreement leads to a relaxation of regulatory barriers to trade, the same
benefits must be provided to all WTO members for whom similar conditions
exist. This last qualification is important: when bilateral or regional regulatory
cooperation produces, for instance, mutual recognition or harmonized
standards on the basis of which goods are afforded market access between the
parties to these arrangements, it is not necessary to offer comparable market
access to a member state that is unable or unwilling to meet justified criteria.
These justified criteria include the level of protection in domestic regulation to
which parties of the bilateral or regional arrangement are stipulating as a
condition for market access among themselves.
EU-level regulations have frequently been challenged in WTO dispute
settlement. A pre-WTO GATT case, European Economic Community—
Imports Of Beef From Canada (EEC–Beef), illustrates the basic operation of
12
the MFN principle in relation to regulatory standards. The European
Economic Community (EEC) had conditioned preferential market access for
certain beef imports on their quality certification by the United States
13
Department of Agriculture (USDA). Canada brought a complaint before a
GATT panel, arguing this stipulation violated the MFN provision because it
gave advantageous treatment to beef imports from the United States, which
were in fact the only products certified by the USDA to the quality standard in
14
question. Importantly, Canada stated it could provide evidence that its beef,
although not entitled to certification by the USDA, was of equivalent quality to
15
the USDA-approved American beef.
Not surprisingly, the panel found the condition of USDA certification,
16
constituted a violation of MFN. At the time, no free trade agreement existed
between the United States and the EEC, but one could easily imagine a
bilateral deal with a mutual recognition provision that generally required each
of the parties to accept the others’ quality certification standards and
procedures as a basis for market access. Applying the logic of the EEC–Beef
panel, such an arrangement between the United States and the EEC would
11. GATT, supra note 3, art. I, The text of Article I reads:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with
importation or exportation or imposed in the international transfer of payments for imports or
exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to
all rule and formalities in connection with importation and exportation … any advantage,
favor, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or
destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like
product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.
12. Report of the Panel, European Economic Community—Imports of Beef from Canada, L/5099
(Mar. 10, 1981), GATT B.I.S.D. (28th Supp.) (1981).
13. Id. ¶ 2.4–2.5.
14. Id. ¶ 3.6.
15. Id.
16. Id. ¶ 4.6.
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have violated the MFN provision unless extended to Canada and its regulatory
authorities (assuming Canadian standards and conformity assessment
procedures were equivalent in terms of achieving the policy purpose in
question), and their conformity assessment procedures were equally credible.
In sum, regional or bilateral arrangements are not per se contrary to MFN, but
they must be open—that is, allow all WTO members the opportunity to
demonstrate equivalency.
In the well-known United States—Import Prohibition Of Certain Shrimp
17
And Shrimp Products (US–Shrimp) case, decided during the current WTO era,
the WTO Appellate Body was confronted with a U.S. scheme that addressed
the mortality of sea turtles caused by non-use of Turtle Excluder Device
trawlers. Regarding the extraterritorial application of the scheme, the U.S.
statute provided for negotiations with U.S. trading partners to ensure adequate
18
protection of sea turtles. If negotiations failed after a certain deadline, shrimp
imports from the countries that had not reached a regulatory cooperation
agreement with the United States would be prohibited, unless the shrimp
fishers adopted the turtle exclusion technology required of domestic fishers
19
under U.S. law. The United States succeeded in reaching such an agreement
with countries in the Western Hemisphere, but not with Asian countries, the
20
complainants in this dispute.
The WTO Appellate Body held, based upon evidence presented at the first
instance level, that the import ban on shrimp from the Asian countries could
21
not be justified under the Article XX exception of the GATT relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources; the United States, inter alia, had
failed to make an equivalent effort to negotiate an accord with the Asian
22
partners. The chapeau of Article XX required that a measure justified under
Article XX must not be applied in an arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminatory
23
manner. Pursuing a solution of regulatory cooperation with some WTO
24
members to the exclusion of others constituted such discrimination.
In a follow-up ruling, the Appellate Body clarified that the terms of a
regulatory cooperation agreement with some WTO members could provide a
benchmark as to what must, generally speaking, be offered to others in order to
25
meet the nondiscrimination requirement. But allowances must be made for
different conditions in different countries or regions. Thus, it would not be a per
17. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998).
18. Id. ¶ 1.
19. Id. ¶ 3.
20. Id. ¶ 6.
21. Id. ¶ 59.
22. Id. ¶171.
23. Id, ¶ 177.
24. Id. ¶ 184.
25. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, ¶ 124, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/RW (adopted Oct. 22, 2001).
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se violation of the relevant nondiscrimination norm that the same deal is not
offered to a different group of countries, but any less favorable aspect would
need to be justified. In sum, the Shrimp–Turtle cases reinforce the notion that
any bilateral or regional regulatory cooperation must be open to all other WTO
members and must not lead to discriminatory conditions for market access—
that is, conditions not justified by objective differences between the countries in
question. More recently in the European Communities—Measures Prohibiting
the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products (EC–Seal Products) case, the
WTO Appellate Body stressed that de facto discrimination is prohibited under
Article I of the GATT, and that any detrimental impact on competitive
opportunities for a comparable imported product from one WTO Member
26
relative to others is likely to violate Article I.
The Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (Brazil–
Retreaded Tyres) case provides another illustration of the WTO law obstacles to
preferential liberalization of regulatory trade barriers under a free trade
27
agreement. In that case, Brazil sought to justify a ban on imports of retreaded
28
tires on environmental and health policy grounds. The WTO Appellate Body
accepted these reasons; however, under its obligations in the Mercosur free
trade arrangement, Brazil was required to exempt other Mercosur countries
29
from the ban. The Appellate Body held this exemption violated the
requirement that measures justified under Article XX of the GATT not be
applied in a manner that is arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminatory, reasoning
the exemption of the Mercosur countries was unrelated to the environmental
and health objectives on the basis of which Brazil had sought to justify its tire
30
measure as a whole.
III
ARTICLE XXIV OF GATT: REGIONALISM AND REGULATORY COOPERATION
In Brazil–Tyres the WTO Appellate Body did not refer to Article XXIV of
the GATT. The provision allows preferential treatment of members in a free
trade area or customs union—a stark deviation from the MFN provision of
Article I of the GATT. One reason why Article XXIV did not become the basis
for considering Brazil’s Mercosur exemption is the restrictive approach to
Article XXIV the Appellate Body had taken some years before in the Turkey—
Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products (Turkey–Textiles)
31
case.
26. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and
Marketing of Seal Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS400/R–WT/DS401/R (adopted May 22, 2014).
27. Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WTO Doc.
WT/DS332/AB/R (adopted June 12, 2007).
28. Id. ¶ 2.
29. Id. ¶ 258.
30. Id.
31. Appellate Body Report, Turkey—Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products,
WTO Doc. WT/DS34/AB/R (adopted Nov. 19, 1999).
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In that ruling, the Appellate Body held that Article XXIV must be strictly
read to allow deviations only from the MFN obligation of the GATT and no
other provision, even when Article XXIV plays an ancillary or closely related
function to the MFN obligation in sustaining the nondiscriminatory character of
32
the multilateral trading system. Further, the Appellate Body held it must be
shown that the deviation from MFN is necessary for the operation of the free
33
trade area or customs union. Although the concept of a free trade area or
customs union as articulated in Article XXIV of the GATT clearly entails
elimination of all or virtually all tariffs and related border measures between
the parties, it is far from clear that preferential treatment with respect to
regulatory-type measures is a sine qua non of a free trade area or customs
union.
An evolutionary interpretive approach to Article XXIV might lead to the
view that addressing regulatory barriers is essential to the operation of free
trade agreements or customs unions as they are currently understood; Article I
of GATT, the MFN obligation, applies explicitly not only to tariffs but also to
internal regulations and other measures. This invites the question as to why the
Article XXIV exception to MFN would also not apply, mutatis mutandis, to
34
these other measures when they would otherwise run afoul of Article I.
Yet applying Article XXIV to regulatory cooperation in the context of a
free trade area or customs union may not be so simple. Article XXIV does not
permit a free trade area or customs union to result in an overall increase of
trade restrictiveness toward third parties—WTO members outside of the
35
preferential arrangement. This could well be the case if regulatory cooperation
under a regional arrangement yields a regulatory standard that becomes a
condition of market access to that entire area and resultantly shuts out third
country producers who do not meet that standard who, prior to the exercise in
regulatory cooperation or coordination, might have been able to sell their
products to one or more countries within the free trade area. Suppose, for
example, Japanese producers have been selling certain advanced electronic
equipment to the United States but not to Europe, where interconnectivity
standards are inconsistent with Japanese products. If under TTIP, the standard
were harmonized to match Europe’s, Japanese producers would lose access to
the U.S. market. This kind of trade diversion, based on regulatory cooperation
or harmonization under free trade arrangements, clearly is in tension with the
approach of Article XXIV of GATT.

32. Id. ¶ 64.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Joel P. Trachtman, Toward Open Recognition? Standardization and Regional
Integration Under Article XXIV of GATT (The Changing Architecture of the Global Trading System:
Regionalism and the WTO, Working Draft, Apr. 22, 2002), http://ssrn.com/abstract=317858.
35. GATT, supra note 3.
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IV
THE TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE AGREEMENT
The TBT Agreement operates concurrently with and independently of
GATT, and contains disciplines that relate to most kinds of product standards
36
and regulations that affect international trade. Notably, whereas the TBT
Agreement has an MFN obligation (held by the Appellate Body in several cases
37
to be functionally equivalent to that in GATT), TBT has no equivalent Article
38
XXIV exception. Additionally, no equivalent exists to the Article XX
exceptions in GATT for public morals, health, conservation of exhaustible
natural resources and the like. Responding to this last gap, the Appellate Body
has read into the MFN provision of TBT the notion that if the detrimental
treatment of like-imported products flows exclusively from a “legitimate
39
regulatory distinction,” then it is permissible.
The extent to which less favorable treatment of imports by WTO members
not part of a regional regulatory cooperation or harmonization regime may be
justified as a “legitimate regulatory distinction” may be derived by considering
the broader context of the TBT Agreement. The TBT Agreement contains a
range of specific provisions that constrain regulatory cooperation or
40
harmonization that is not open to all WTO members. Its preamble refers to
the requirement that TBT measures “not be applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
41
countries where the same conditions prevail.” This suggests the considerations
concerning the same language in the chapeau of Article XX of GATT discussed
above would also be relevant under the TBT Agreement. The exclusive
regional arrangements that limit regulatory cooperation to only some WTO
members, such as the parties to a free trade agreement may well be
incompatible with the TBT Agreement as a general matter, as would regulatory
market access restrictions from which the members of a free trade agreement
are exempt but that are applied to other WTO members.
Article 2.6 of TBT refers to the goal of “harmonizing technical regulations
on as wide a basis as possible . . . .” Article 4.1 of TBT requires that WTO
Members “take such reasonable measures as may be available to them to
ensure that . . . regional standardization bodies of which they or one or more
bodies within their territories are members, accept and comply with” the Code
36. See ROBERT HOWSE ET AL., THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 288–322 (4th ed.
2014).
37. See id.
38. Trachtman suggests that Article XXIV of GATT be read into the TBT Agreement. See
Trachtman, supra note 34, at 9. However, as indicated, the structure of Article XXIV would make its
application to regulatory measures very problematic, even assuming that the Appellate Body were
prepared to take such a radical step.
39. Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove
Cigarettes, WTO Doc. WT/DS406/AB/R (adopted Apr. 4, 2012).
40. Id.¶ 174.
41. TBT, supra note 5, pmbl. (emphasis added).
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of Good Practice in the TBT Agreement. In addition to a range of notification
and transparency requirements, the Code of Good Practice stipulates,
With a view to harmonizing standards on as wide a basis as possible, the standardizing
body shall, in an appropriate way, play a full part, within the limits of its resources, in
the preparation by relevant international standardizing bodies of international
standards regarding subject matter for which it either has adopted, or expects to
adopt, standards. For standardizing bodies within the territory of a Member,
participation in a particular international standardization activity shall, whenever
possible, take place through one delegation representing all standardizing bodies in
the territory that have adopted, or expect to adopt, standards
for the subject matter to
42
which the international standardization activity relates.

Further, regional standardization bodies “shall make every effort to avoid
duplication of, or overlap with, the work of relevant international standardizing
43
bodies.”
The concern that regional regulatory cooperation, standardization or
harmonization could have trade-restrictive effects is implied in the requirement
in 10.7 of the TBT Agreement that
[w]henever a Member has reached an agreement with any other country or countries
on issues related to technical regulations, standards or conformity assessment
procedures which may be a significant effect on trade, at least one Member party to
the agreement shall notify other Members through the Secretariats of the products to
be covered by the agreement and include a brief description of the agreement.

Notably, the TBT Agreement does not require that such bilateral or
regional agreements be extended to all WTO members but rather only that the
parties to such agreements “are encouraged to enter, upon request, into
consultations with other Members for the purposes of concluding similar
44
agreements or of arranging for their participation in such agreements.”
One of the key disciplines of the TBT Agreement is the obligation for WTO
members to use relevant “international standards” as a “basis” for their
technical regulations, unless the international standards are ineffective or
45
inappropriate. But international standards themselves are mostly of a
voluntary nature and do not result, in most cases, in binding treaty
commitments; quite a few of these standards are the creation of
nongovernmental bodies, or private–public partnerships in which industry is the
driving force. By virtue of Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, a very broad
range of normative material—including privately generated norms in some
cases—is transformed into an international legal obligation.
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement requires WTO members to use
international standards as a basis for their domestic regulations when they are
46
available and appropriate. In dicta in the European Communities—Trade

42. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade Annex 3, Jan. 1, 1995, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120.
43. Id.
44. TBT, supra note 5, art. 10.7.
45. Id. at art. 2.4.
46. Id. (“[E]xcept when such international standards or relevant parts would be an ineffective or
inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued.”).
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47

Description of Sardines (EC–Sardines) ruling, the Appellate Body suggested
that “a very strong and very close relationship” may be required between
domestic regulations and international standards to satisfy the obligation under
48
TBT 2.4 to use international standards as a “basis.” The Appellate Body has
implied that international standards have considerable automatic legal force in
49
the WTO. The TBT Agreement, however, does not define international
standards, nor does the agreement attempt to list the international regimes that
are qualified to promulgate international standards within the meaning of TBT
2.4.
In its consideration of Mexico’s claims under TBT 2.4, the panel in Tuna–
Dolphin II found that a regional organization, the Agreement on the
International Dolphin Conservation Program (AIDCP)—whose membership
50
consisted of several countries in the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific—was
an international standardization body based in part on the determination that
51
the AIDCP was open to all WTO members. The panel reasoned that openness
to all WTO members includes a situation in which the existing members of a
body may, at their discretion, decide to accept a WTO Member as a new
52
member of that body. The panel also suggested the criterion of openness could
be fulfilled if, during a certain temporal window, all WTO members had an
53
opportunity to choose to join the body.
Unsurprisingly, the Appellate Body reversed the panel’s finding that the
54
AIDCP was a standardization body open to all WTO members. The Appellate
Body acknowledged that the states parties to the AIDCP could invite a WTO
Member to join the AIDCP at their discretion, but it was not persuaded that
such an invitation was a mere formality that would automatically follow from a
55
WTO Member’s expression of interest in membership. Thus, the AIDCP is not

47. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Trade Description of Sardines, WTO Doc.
WT/DS231/AB/R, DSR 2002:VIII, 3359 (adopted Sept. 26, 2002).
48. Id. ¶ 245.
49. See id ¶¶ 245–246 (stressing the close relationship between an international standard that is
the basis for a technical regulation).
50. Including Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Perú, the United States, Vanuatu, and Venezuela.
51. Panel Report, United States—Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of
Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/R (adopted Sept. 15, 2011).
52. Id. at 280 (“[T]he AIDCP remains open to accession to any State . . . that is invited to accede
to the Agreement on the basis of the parties’ decision. To this day, the AIDCP membership is therefore
open on a nondiscriminatory basis to the relevant bodies of at least all WTO Members in accordance
with the principle of openness.”).
53. Id. (concluding that because the AIDCP membership was open from May 1998 until May 1999
to states whose vessels fished in the Agreement Area without restrictions on who could fish in the area,
the AIDCP was open to all WTO Members).
54. Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and
Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R (adopted May 16, 2012) [hereinafter
U.S.–Tuna II].
55. Id. ¶ 35.
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56

“open” to all WTO members as a matter of right.
There is an additional difficulty with the panel’s ruling, which the Appellate
Body failed to address but is of considerable importance in understanding the
scope of international standards within the meaning of TBT 2.4. The relevant
language in TBT defining an international standardization body, as noted,
refers to openness to membership of not all WTO members but rather the
57
standardization bodies of all WTO members. The TBT recognizes that these
bodies may include private industry or consumer entities, mixed public and
private entities, or state agencies and entities that have “legal power to enforce
58
a technical regulation.” The AIDCP is a regional treaty regime, and thus
arguably only a state or another entity with international legal personality, such
as an intergovernmental organization, could be a “member,” if indeed
“member” means a party to the constitutive instrument of the regime. Given
that standardization bodies often lack the international legal personality to join
international organizations or treaty regimes, a risk exists that the extremely
important standardization activities of international intergovernmental
organizations (ranging from the World Health Organization to the
International Atomic Energy Agency to the International Labor Organization)
would not qualify as international standards within the meaning of TBT 2.4.
One solution would be to say it is sufficient that every WTO Member be
able to join the organization such that its standardization bodies, whether
private, public, or mixed, can participate in the standardization work in
question through the Member’s official delegation. Here, however, there is the
concern that a state might have different positions in an international
intergovernmental organization than those of a nonstate standardization body,
and in any case would not want the activities or positions of the nonstate body
attributed to it. So this solution is not perfect. It also will not work where the
international intergovernmental organization permits only states to be
Members, since not all Members of the WTO are states—for example, Hong
59
Kong.
Although reversing the panel on whether the AIDCP is “open’” to all WTO
members, and failing to take account of the complexities just discussed, the
Appellate Body did (to its credit) elaborate a broader framework for
understanding the meaning of “international standards” in TBT 2.4, offering
useful guidance to future panels.
First, the Appellate Body held that
a required element of the definition of an “international” standard for the purposes of
the TBT Agreement is the approval of the standard by an “international standardizing
body,” that is, a body that has recognized activities in standardization and whose
membership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all Members. As we see it, the
56. Id. ¶ 35–36.
57. TBT, supra note 5, XVII Annex 1.A.4 (“Body or system whose membership is open to the
relevant bodies of at least all Members.”).
58. Id. at XVII Annex 1.A.8.
59. Thanks to Gabrielle Marceau for a very useful discussion on this issue.
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different components of this definition inform each other. The interpretation of the
term “international standardizing body” is therefore a holistic
exercise in which the
60
components of the definition are to be considered together.

Second, the Appellate Body noted,
[A] ‘standardizing body’,” that is, a body with ‘recognized activities in
standardization’, does not need to have standardization as its principal function, or
even as one of its principal functions.[] At the same time, we note that the factual
dimension of the concept of ‘recognition’ would appear to require, at a minimum, that
WTO Members are aware, or have reason to expect,
that the international body in
61
question is engaged in standardization activities.

These are important findings because, subject to the difficulty concerning
openness to standardization bodies of all WTO members, it allows the
standardization activities of international organizations, the main mandate of
which is not standardization, to nevertheless be eligible as international
standards within the meaning of TBT 2.4. The same would be true of
nongovernmental organizations concerned with fair trade or sustainability, for
example.
Third, the Appellate Body found that “the TBT Agreement also aims to
encourage the development of international standards by bodies that were not
already engaged in activities at the time of the adoption of the TBT
62
Agreement.” This is very important because international standards (codes of
conduct) figure significantly in emerging issues such as sustainability of biofuels
and deforestation. For example, the relevant bodies may not have existed prior
to the creation of the WTO.
Fourth, in a finding with broad jurisprudential implications, the Appellate
Body reasoned:
The TBT Committee Decision assists in the determination of whether an
international body has “recognized activities in standardization.” As an initial matter,
we note that the TBT Committee Decision establishes principles and procedures that
WTO Members have decided ‘should be observed’ in the development of
international standards. Evidence that an international body has followed the
principles and procedures of the TBT Committee Decision in developing a standard
would therefore be relevant for a determination of whether the body’s activities in
standardization are “recognized” by WTO Members. More specifically, we recall that
the word “recognize” is defined as “[a]cknowledge the existence, legality, or validity
of, [especially] by formal approval or sanction; accord notice or attention to; treat as
worthy of consideration” and that the concept of ‘recognition’ has a factual and a
normative dimension. . . other elements of the TBT Agreement, as well as the TBT
Committee Decision, reflect the intent of WTO Members to ensure that the
development of international standards take place transparently and with wide
participation. The obligations and privileges associated with international standards
pursuant to Articles 2.4 and 2.5 of the TBT Agreement further underscore the
imperative that international standardizing bodies ensure representative participation

60. U.S.–Tuna II, supra note 54, ¶ 359.
61. Id. ¶ 362.
62. Id. ¶ 379.
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and transparency in the development of international standards. In analyzing whether
an entity is an63“international standardizing body,” a panel needs to balance these
considerations.
64

The TBT Committee Decision referenced by the Appellate Body contains
six principles: (1) transparency, including that all proposals and final results be
“easily” accessible to all interested parties in all WTO members; (2) openness,
including what would seem both de facto and de jure nondiscriminatory
participatory opportunities at all stages of standards development; (3)
impartiality and consensus, (4) effectiveness and relevance, including
prioritization of performance-based standards and a requirement not to give
preference to the needs or interests of particular counties and regions; (5)
coherence, including cooperation and coordination with other relevant
international standardization bodies; and (6) facilitation of meaningful
65
participation of developing countries. The Appellate Body appears to give
particular normative weight to participation and transparency.
The Appellate Body finding that the TBT Decision is relevant to the
determination of whether a standardization body not merely is open to all
WTO members but is engaged in recognized standardization activities—an
absolute legal precondition to the standard being an international standard
within the meaning of TBT 2.4—implies that, since there is no list of recognized
bodies or activities within the TBT Agreement itself, each time there is a claim
concerning an “international standard” under TBT 2.4, the adjudicator must
examine the extent to which the body emitting that standard meets in its
activities the requirements of the six principles (not just those directly related to
the meaning of “openness”). This is a profoundly qualitative exercise that
entails an evaluation of aspects that go well beyond the particular standard
being invoked in the dispute. In effect the Appellate Body has transformed
what would be at best the “soft law” of the Decision into a code of
administrative procedure and practice for international standardization.
In the case of standardization initiatives under free trade agreements that
entail bilateral or regional regulatory cooperation or harmonization, it is hard
to imagine the WTO Appellate Body will not also refer to the decision in
judging the extent to which regional standards provide a basis for “legitimate
regulatory distinctions” in cases where a nonparty to the free trade agreement
argues disparate impact discrimination due to the detrimental effect of the
regional standard on its access to the markets of the countries within the free
trade area.

63. Id. ¶¶ 376, 379.
64. Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Decisions and Recommendations Adopted by the
WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade since 1 January 1995, WTO Doc. G/TBT/1/Rev.9
(Sept. 8, 2008).
65. Id. at 37–39.
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V
THE WTO SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES AGREEMENT
The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement (SPS) applies to a
66
subset of product regulations and standards that relate to food and agriculture.
There are considerable similarities between the SPS and TBT Agreements,
although the SPS has a distinctive feature requiring that science-based risk
assessments support those SPS regulations not in conformity with—that is,
67
stricter than—the relevant international standards. Like the TBT, the SPS
places considerable emphasis on harmonization through international
standards, but unlike the TBT, the SPS lists the most relevant international
standardization organizations, such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission of
68
the Food and Agriculture Organization. This emphasis on harmonization is
readily apparent in Article 2.3 of the SPS, which provides, “Members shall
ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary measures do not arbitrarily or
unjustifiably discriminate between Members where identical or similar
conditions prevail.”
VI
THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES
69

Unlike the SPS and the TBT, the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) does have a provision, Article V, that allows for some deviation from
nondiscrimination in relation to the operation of a free trade area or customs
union. There are some similarities between this provision and the wording of
the parallel provision in GATT’s Article XXIV, but also important differences.
Article V states that GATS “shall not prevent any of its Members from being a
party to or entering into an agreement liberalizing trade in services between or
among the parties to such an agreement,” provided there is “substantial sectoral
coverage” and absence of or elimination of “substantially all discrimination”
70
between domestic and imported services among the parties to the agreement.
But this is subject to a requirement that the agreement not “raise the overall
level of barriers to trade in services within the respective sectors or subsectors
compared to the level applicable prior to such an agreement” for Members
outside the agreement.
GATS in Article VI sets out a process for creating sectoral multilateral
71
disciplines through “qualification requirements and procedures.” To date,
progress has been slow in the development of such sectoral codes, with
accounting standards as the exception. There is, however, an interim

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

SPS, supra note 6.
Id. at art. 5.8.
Id. at art. 3.4.
GATS, supra note 9.
Id. at art. V.
Id. at art. VI.4.
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discipline—that is, until a sectoral code is implemented—requiring members
who have made a commitment to liberalize services in a particular sector must,
inter alia, ensure that their regulatory measures are “based on objective and
transparent criteria, such as competence and the ability supply the service” and
are “not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service.”
Existing international standards are cited as a preferred benchmark for
determining whether a member is in conformity with this interim discipline.
With respect to mutual-recognition agreements, GATS has a very specific
norm that these must be open to all WTO members. Thus, Article VII.2
provides that a WTO member party to a mutual-recognition agreement “shall
afford adequate opportunity for other interested Members to negotiate their
accession to such an agreement or arrangement or to negotiate comparable
ones with it,” and Article VII.3 states, “A Member shall not accord recognition
in a manner which would constitute a means of discrimination between
countries in the application of its standards or criteria for the authorization,
licensing or certification of services suppliers.”
If we interpret Article V on “economic integration” in light of these
provisions, it provides a very limited basis for arguing that regulatory
cooperation or harmonization within the free trade area providing preferential
access to free trade agreement parties is required in order to create or operate a
free trade area. This is because opening up such regulatory cooperation to
harmonization to others, on comparable terms, as explicitly contemplated in the
GATS, would not, on any plausible scenario, prevent liberalization of trade
within the free trade area.
VII
CONCLUSION
The WTO multilateral legal framework is permissive of regulatory
cooperation and harmonization in the context of bilateral or regional trade
agreements. At the same time, there is very limited ambit under that framework
to operate a two-tier approach, in which regulatory barriers to market access
are higher for those WTO members that are outside the bilateral or regional
free trade area. Any such differences would generally need to be justified based
upon objective policy considerations, as opposed to the mere membership of
the preferred states in the free trade arrangement. Further, WTO law and
jurisprudence stress international standards as a basis for regulatory
cooperation or harmonization, or both, as well as the importance of the
openness, transparency, and participatory rights of all WTO members in
international standardization activity. It is not permissible to allow a WTO
member, without justification, to offer regulatory cooperation to some states,
such as members of a bilateral or regional free trade area, but to deny the same
regulatory cooperation to similarly situated states. The longstanding memberstate conception of Article XXIV of GATT—as a provision that allows for
preferential elimination of tariffs among the members of a free trade area or
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customs union—has often led to an assumption that such arrangements may
also offer preferential treatment with respect to regulatory barriers to trade.
But there is safe haven in the WTO framework for regulatory discrimination
between WTO members that are parties and those that are nonparties to a
bilateral or regional free trade agreement. The new regional agreements being
negotiated now may provide avenues for enhanced regulatory cooperation, but
to be consistent with WTO norms, these avenues must be opened up to all
WTO members where the conditions are appropriate for their participation.

